How Did the Black Sea Grain Initiative Work and What Was Türkiye's Role?

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was a time-limited arrangement that let commercial cargo ships leave Ukraine's Black Sea ports during the war with Russia. Ukraine is a major exporter of wheat, corn and sunflower oil, and the blockade of its ports in 2022 pushed up concern about food prices and supply in import-dependent countries. Understanding how the deal was built, and why it collapsed, explains much of the later debate about Black Sea shipping and security.

Background: From Blockade to Istanbul

After Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, commercial shipping out of Ukraine's ports largely stopped. Ukraine's grain was stuck in storage and in ports, while global food prices were already elevated. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Türkiye's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Ukrainian and Russian governments spent several months in talks on a way to restart exports.

The result was a package signed in Istanbul on 2022-07-22. It had two separate parts:

• The Black Sea Grain Initiative, formally the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports, agreed by Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN. Russia and Ukraine signed parallel texts with Türkiye and the UN rather than a single document with each other.
• A memorandum of understanding between Russia and the UN Secretariat on facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports to world markets.

The UN presented the two as linked in practice, though they were legally distinct documents.

How the Initiative Worked

The Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul

The Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) was the operating hub. It was based in Istanbul and staffed by senior representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN, with the UN providing the secretariat function. It began work in late July 2022, and the first ship, the Razoni, left Odesa on 2022-08-01.

The JCC's core tasks were:

• registering commercial vessels that wished to take part;
• agreeing the transit corridor and schedule for ships in and out of Ukrainian waters;
• organizing inspections;
• publishing data on voyages and cargo.

The three ports and the corridor

The initiative covered three Ukrainian ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny (also written Pivdennyi). Ships moved along a designated maritime humanitarian corridor in the Black Sea. The parties pledged not to attack vessels or port facilities involved in the arrangement.

The inspection process

Inspections were meant to reassure all sides. Russia wanted confidence that inbound ships were not carrying weapons. Ukraine and importers wanted confidence that outbound shipments would not be delayed or attacked.

1. A ship was registered with the JCC and cleared to proceed.
2. Inbound empty vessels were inspected, near Istanbul, by joint teams made up of officials from the four parties.
3. The ship then sailed to one of the three Ukrainian ports and loaded cargo.
4. Outbound loaded vessels were inspected again before continuing to their destination.

Over time, the speed of inspections became a point of contention. The UN and Ukraine said slowdowns and a growing backlog of waiting ships reduced the volume that could move, while Russia said the inspection system was working as agreed. Both views are summarized in the comparison section below.

What was shipped

According to UN figures, the initiative moved roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs in about a year, with corn and wheat making up the largest shares. Cargoes reached a wide range of countries, including both high-income importers and developing economies. The exact split between income groups was disputed, and the UN and Russia presented the figures differently.

The FAO Food Price Index had peaked in March 2022 and declined in the following months. Analysts disagree on how much of that decline was due to the initiative compared with other market factors, so this article does not attribute the fall to the deal alone.

The Parallel Russia–UN Memorandum

The memorandum addressed Russia's concern that, although food and fertilizer were not directly targeted by Western sanctions, banking, insurance, shipping and port access problems were holding back its exports. In the document, the UN undertook to engage with the relevant parties to help remove obstacles to Russian agricultural exports.

The UN has said it worked on these issues, and the EU and US have stated that their sanctions contain exemptions for agricultural products and fertilizer. Russia argued that practical barriers remained, and it repeatedly named three: the reconnection of the state agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank to the SWIFT payment messaging system, restrictions on shipping and insurance, and the resumption of an ammonia pipeline to a Ukrainian port. This disagreement became the central reason Moscow gave for ending its participation.

Timeline: Extensions and the 2023 Suspension

Date	Event
2022-07-22	Agreements signed in Istanbul
2022-08-01	First ship, the Razoni, leaves Odesa
2022-11-17	Initiative extended for another 120 days
2023-03-18	Extended again; Russia and Ukraine/UN described the length differently (60 vs 120 days)
2023-05-17	Extended for two months, to mid-July
2023-07-17	Russia announces it is ending its participation; the deal lapses

The original agreement ran for 120 days and was renewable unless a party objected. Each renewal came with Russian complaints about the memorandum's implementation. In July 2023 Russia declined to extend, and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the arrangement was halted because the Russian side of the package had not been fulfilled. Days later, the Russian Defence Ministry said that ships heading to Ukrainian ports could be treated as potential carriers of military cargo.

For how the Straits fit into the broader regional picture, see Black Sea Security and the Turkish Straits: A Complete Guide.

Key Players and Positions

Russia

Russian officials, including the Foreign Ministry and the Kremlin, said that the initiative delivered benefits to Ukraine and its Western partners while the promises on Russian exports were not honored. They argued that too much grain went to wealthier countries rather than the poorest, and that the memorandum's practical measures did not materialize. Moscow said it would return if its conditions were met.

Ukraine

Ukrainian officials, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, said the corridor was important for Ukraine's economy and for global food security, and accused Russia of using food supplies as leverage. After the lapse, Ukraine said it would try to keep shipping through its own temporary corridor, and in August 2023 began doing so, though the route carried security risks. Russian strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure continued to be reported afterward.

The United Nations

The UN described the initiative as a humanitarian success and regretted its end. Guterres had sent proposals to Russia in 2023 aimed at addressing its demands, including options for connecting an agricultural bank to payment systems. The UN maintained that it had no authority over sanctions, which are decisions of individual states and blocs.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Turkish Sources

Türkiye's Position

Türkiye was the host and a signatory, and its officials describe its role as that of an impartial facilitator trusted by both sides. The points below summarize Ankara's stated position, based on statements by the Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence. They reflect Turkish government views, not independent findings.

• Mediation. Ankara argues that it can talk to both Moscow and Kyiv, and says it has hosted talks since the early weeks of the war, including meetings in Istanbul in March 2022 that preceded the grain deal.
• Food security. According to President Erdoğan's public remarks, Türkiye views the initiative as a way to ease pressure on import-dependent countries, especially in Africa and the Middle East.
• Revival. After July 2023, Turkish officials said they would keep working to restore the arrangement. Erdoğan met Vladimir Putin in Sochi on 2023-09-04 to discuss it, with no revival following.
• Territorial integrity. Türkiye says it supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and does not recognize the annexation of Crimea, while it has not joined Western sanctions on Russia.
• Straits regime. Ankara says it applies the Montreux Convention impartially. In February 2022 it invoked Article 19 to restrict the passage of warships of belligerent states, while commercial traffic continued under the convention. For the legal basis, see What Is the Montreux Convention and How Does It Govern the Turkish Straits?.

Critics, including some analysts in Ukraine and in Western capitals, argue that Türkiye's balancing approach gives it limited leverage over Russia. Turkish officials respond that keeping channels open is the point, and that the initiative's results are evidence it works.

Source Comparison

Source type	How it frames the initiative	What to check
UN statements and JCC data	A humanitarian arrangement that moved food to world markets, ended by Russia's decision	Volumes and voyage counts come from the UN's own reporting
Russian government (Kremlin, Foreign Ministry)	A deal whose Russian side was never delivered	Claims about the share going to poor countries and sanctions obstacles are disputed by the UN and Western governments
Ukrainian government	A vital corridor that Russia obstructed and then abandoned	Claims about Russian slowdowns and attacks are reported by Ukraine and covered by independent media
Turkish government and Turkish media	A diplomatic achievement for Türkiye and a model of mediation; calls for revival	Emphasis on Ankara's role; official statements are not neutral evidence
Western and international media	Often focus on food-price effects and Russian leverage	Usually quote UN data, but analysis of price effects varies

Readers can check the numbers against UN publications and the JCC's own data rather than relying on any single government. For how we handle claims about Türkiye specifically, see Fact Check: Claims About Türkiye in International Media and Editorial Principles: How WorldPoliticsDaily Separates Fact from Position.

Related Reading

• Black Sea Security and the Turkish Straits: A Complete Guide
• What Is the Montreux Convention and How Does It Govern the Turkish Straits?
• WorldPoliticsDaily FAQ: Sources, Perspective and Method

Perspective Note

WorldPoliticsDaily presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Facts, figures and the positions of other parties are attributed to their own sources. To learn more about who we are, see About WorldPoliticsDaily: Who We Are and Why We Publish.

By the WPD Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• Region Scope: Black Sea Grain Initiative and Türkiye's Russia–Ukraine Mediation: What Happened and Why — How the Black Sea Grain Initiative came about, who brokered it, what Türkiye's mediation role was, and where Russia–Ukraine talks stand after the deal lapsed.
• Interstate Journal: Black Sea Grain Initiative: How Türkiye Helped Broker the Deal — How Türkiye and the UN brokered the July 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative, how the Istanbul centre worked, why Russia quit in 2023 and whether it can return.
• Horizon of Nations: Türkiye's Mediation Record: Black Sea Grain Initiative, Istanbul Talks and Humanitarian Diplomacy — How Türkiye's mediation shaped the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Istanbul talks, prisoner swaps and Gaza diplomacy, with UN, Russian, Ukrainian and Western views.